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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Anthony J. Robins, Jr., appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury
verdict finding him guilty of two counts of aiding and abetting first degree murder,
and one count of aiding and abetting attempted first degree murder. Robins
contends the district court erred in (1) not dismissing his case or disqualifying the
prosecuting attorney from prosecuting his case after notes he claimed were
intended for his attorney were inadvertently disclosed to the state; (2) denying his
motion requesting the ability to call his attorney anytime he wanted during
business hours; (3) denying his motion to sever his case from a co-defendant’s
case based on his assertion that one exhibit was only admissible against his codefendant; and (3) awarding restitution to Idaho Medicaid State Operations for
medical expenses it paid on behalf of two of the victims.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Robins with two counts of aiding and abetting first
degree murder, and one count of aiding and abetting attempted first degree
murder based on his involvement in the murders of Elliott Bailey and Travonte 1
Calloway, and the attempted murder of Jeanette Juraska. (R., pp.114-116.) The
jury found Robins guilty of both counts of aiding and abetting and guilty of aiding
and abetting the attempted first degree murder of Jeanette Juraska. (R., p.481.)
The court imposed concurrent unified life sentences, with 40 years fixed, for both

1

There are various spellings of Travonte included in the record. (R., p.114; PSI,
pp.23, 94.) The state will use the same spelling used in the charging document.
1

of the aiding and abetting first degree murder convictions, and a concurrent fixed
15-year sentence for the aiding and abetting attempted first degree murder
conviction. (R., pp.500-503.)
Robins filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.505-509, 524-529.)
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ISSUES
Robins states the issues on appeal as:
A. What is the appropriate remedy for the state’s violation of Mr.
Robins’s attorney-client privilege?
B. Did the state unlawfully interfere with Mr. Robins’s access to his
attorney pre-trial and what remedy is appropriate?
C. Did the court abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever
defendants and then admitting Exhibit 133 at trial over objection
and without a limiting instruction?
D. Did the court abuse its discretion in awarding $72,791.50 in
restitution to Medicaid and by taking judicial notice of the
existence of a contractual relationship between Medicaid and
the health care providers here?
(Opening Brief of Appellant (“Appellant’s Brief”), p.7.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Robins failed to show any Sixth Amendment violation based on the
inadvertent disclosure of allegedly privileged notes found during a lawful
search of his cell, much less that he is entitled to reversal of his
convictions and dismissal of the charges based on that disclosure?

2.

Has Robins failed to show a Sixth Amendment violation based on the
district court’s denial of his request to allow him to call his attorney
anytime he wanted to during “business hours”?

3.

Has Robins failed to show the district court abused its discretion in
denying his motion to sever his case from one of his co-defendant’s
(Douglas), or in its related determination that Exhibit 133, a selfinculpatory document written by Douglas, was admissible against both
Robins and Douglas?

4.

Has Robins failed to show the district court abused its discretion in
awarding restitution to Medicaid for the economic loss Medicaid incurred
in paying medical expenses for Jeanette Juraska and Travonte Calloway,
two of the directly injured victims in this case?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Robins Has Failed To Demonstrate A Constitutional Violation Based Upon The
Inadvertent Disclosure Of Notes He Allegedly Made For Counsel And Has,
Therefore, Failed To Show He Is Entitled To Any Relief, Much Less The
Extraordinary Relief Of Dismissal
A.

Introduction
Robins requests reversal of his convictions and dismissal of the charges

against him based on the inadvertent disclosure of notes he allegedly prepared
for his attorney, which were discovered during a lawful search of his cell that was
conducted based on information that Robins and one of his co-defendants,
Douglas, were passing notes while incarcerated in the Ada County Jail.
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-21.) Robins is not entitled to the relief he requests, or
any other relief, because he suffered no identifiable prejudice as a result of the
disclosure of his notes.
B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one

of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App.
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001).

4

C.

Because The Inadvertent Disclosure Of Robins’ Notes Did Not Result In
Prejudice, He Has Failed To Show A Constitutional Violation Entitling Him
To Any Relief
Prior to trial, the state received information that Douglas and Robins were

passing notes while incarcerated at the Ada County Jail, including a letter written
“in an attempt to coordinate their stories to minimize liability for Robins.” (R.,
pp.239-242.) As a result, the prosecutor directed jail staff to search Robins’ cell,
Douglas’ cell, and the informant’s cell. (R., p.242.) During the search of Robins’
cell, an officer found a handwritten document that appeared to be related to the
case and forwarded that document to the prosecutor. (R., p.242.) There was no
notation on the document that it was confidential, privileged, or intended to be
sent to counsel.

(Sealed Exhibit 23, 9/23/2015 Hrg.)

Nevertheless, after

reviewing the document, the prosecutor emailed it to one of Robins’ attorneys
and notified him that it was discovered during a search of Robins’ cell. (R.,
pp.242-243.) In response, Robins filed a motion “for an Order requiring the state
to show cause why th[e] Court should not address and impose appropriate relief
in favor of [him] as a result of the State’s seizure and review of attorney-client
privileged communications prepared by [him] for Counsel.” (R., pp.139-140.)
The district court held an evidentiary hearing in relation to Robins’ motion,
and ultimately declined Robins’ request to dismiss the charges against him as a
remedy for the alleged breach of his attorney-client privilege. (R., pp.297-303.)
In doing so, the district court made several pertinent findings, including:
The notes at issue were created at the direction of Mr. Robins’
attorney. However, the notes were not addressed to his attorneys,
nor marked or labeled in any way to indicate that they were private,
confidential, or attorney-client communications. The notes were not

5

inadvertently delivered to any third party, but were seized pursuant
to a lawful search.
Indeed, except for now knowing the
circumstances of their creation, there would be no way to know with
certainty that the notes were intended for Mr. Robins’ attorney or
perhaps to refresh his memory in a future meeting with his attorney.
(R., p.300.)
The district court further observed that, as an inmate, Robins did “not have
an expectation of privacy” and, pursuant to jail policy, Robins’ cell could be
“searched at any time.” (R., p.300; see also pp.237-238.) Thus, “it is entirely
reasonable to expect and require that if an inmate wants to ensure the
confidentiality of communications, they should at least be properly labeled, for
ease of identification for the jailers.” (R., p.300.) Robins did not do so. Rather,
[i]n this case, it appears that the Deputies did not thoroughly review
the notes, but rather quickly scanned the notes to determine
whether they were something that met the description of their
directive. Since the notes were not labeled as attorney-client
privileged communications, they likely appeared, on quick review,
to possibly be the improper inmate communications they were
looking for. Likewise, it appears that Sargent Ivie likely did not
thoroughly read the notes, but simply passed them to the
Prosecutor with an email stating that he was not sure if they were
the contraband notes at issue. Only after the Prosecutor reviewed
the notes with sufficient care did she realize that the notes were not
in fact the contraband letter, but apparently private notes probably
intended for a lawyer.
(R., p.301.)
Based on the “sequence of events,” the district court found the discovery
and review of the notes was “akin to an inadvertent disclosure of attorney-client
privileged material that sometimes occurs in discovery.” (R., p.301.)
Although the district court found that the “disclosure of attorney-client
privileged material” was inadvertent, it also considered whether Robins was

6

prejudiced.

(R., pp.301-303.) In ruling on Robins’ pre-trial request for relief

based on the prosecutor’s review of his handwritten notes, the district court found
that Robins’ “case may have been prejudiced by the State’s exposure to the
notes” to the extent it gave the state “an inside look as to how Mr. Robins
view[ed] his case and his defense.” (R., p.302.) However, the court also found it
was “impossible to determine whether there will ever be any actual prejudice to
the defense.” (R., p.302.) Because the state indicated it was prepared to identify
an “independent source for each statement contained within Robins’s notes,” the
district court declined to “impose the extreme sanctions of dismissal of the case
or recusal of the Prosecutor as suggested by” Robins. (R., pp.302-303.) The
court instead afforded Robins the following remedies: (1) exclusion of the notes;
and (2) return of all copies of the document and “any notes or memos” the state
“made regarding the contents.” (R., p.302.) The court further advised that
if, during the course of the trial, the defense believes that the
prosecution is offering evidence or argument that could only have
been obtained by way of [the] notes, the defense must object (and
as the State suggests it is able to do) the State will then have the
burden to demonstrate that the evidence or argument was known
separate and apart from [the] notes. If the State is successful, the
evidence will not be inadmissible on that basis alone; however, if
the State cannot persuade the Court that it had some independent
knowledge of the fact(s) in dispute, then the evidence will be
inadmissible.
(R., p.303.)
The remedy fashioned by the district court is consistent with Stuart v.
State, 118 Idaho 932, 801 P.2d 1283 (1990), and State v. Martinez, 102 Idaho
875, 643 P.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1982).

In Stuart, the Idaho Supreme Court

considered the proper course of action when confidential attorney-client
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conversations were allegedly surreptitiously recorded by law enforcement and
disclosed to the prosecutor. 118 Idaho at 933, 801 P.2d at 1284. In addressing
this issue the Court held that “[a]ttorney-client conversations are constitutionally
protected and cannot be invaded by the State,” and that “monitoring and
recording” such conversations “may deny a defendant the constitutional right of
effective assistance of counsel,” and “the constitutional right to due process.” Id.
at 935, 801 P.2d at 1286 (citations omitted). Because the issue arose in the
context of a post-conviction petition, which was summarily dismissed despite the
existence of material issues of fact, the Court remanded “to the trial court with
instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing” to determine: “(1) whether there was
recording of attorney-client conversations on the part of the Sherriff’s
Department; and (2) whether [Stuart’s] constitutional rights were violated.” Id.
The Court further ordered that, if the privileged conversations were recorded, the
state would be “required to show that the evidence at trial had an origin
independent of the eavesdropping” because, “[a]ny knowledge wrongfully gained
by the government cannot be used against a defendant.” Id. (citations omitted).
The Court of Appeals considered a similar issue in Martinez, 102 Idaho
875, 643 P.2d 555. In that case, “[t]he sheriff, believing that Martinez posed a
severe security risk, monitored and tape recorded all phone calls made by
Martinez, including one call made to an attorney.” Id. at 878, 643 P.2d at 558.
Martinez’s mail was also photocopied, some of which “contained information
concerning the existence of his common law marriage to a woman who was a
potential witness in the case.” Id. Martinez claimed he was entitled to dismissal
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as a result of “interference with his right to counsel.” Id. The Court of Appeals
disagreed that such an “extraordinary remedy” was appropriate in Martinez’s
case absent a showing of prejudice; indeed, Martinez could not even
demonstrate he was entitled to a new trial. Id. at 878-879, 643 P.2d at 558-559.
The Court reasoned that Martinez did not suffer prejudice because “[n]one of the
information gathered through surveillance of Martinez’s mail or phone calls was
used as evidence in his trial.” Id. at 879, 643 P.2d at 559. The Court concluded:
“Although we do not condone the practice of monitoring phone calls in either of
these situations, the conduct did not prejudice Martinez’s right to a fair trial.” Id.
at 879, 643 P.2d at 559. It also “did not deny Martinez effective assistance of
counsel.” Id. Accordingly, Martinez was not entitled to either “dismissal of the
information or a grant of [a] new trial.” Id.
Robins did not make any objections during trial on the basis “that the
prosecution [was] offering evidence or argument that could only have been
obtained by way of [the] notes.” (See generally Trial Trs.) Robins acknowledges
as much on appeal (Appellant’s Brief, p.11), and acknowledges that “[i]nsofar as
the district court held that the onus was on the defense in this case to object to
specific pieces of evidence produced at trial, its decision was arguably in accord
with the federal practice,” which is also consistent with the Idaho Supreme
Court’s decision in Stuart, supra (Appellant’s Brief, pp.13-14).

Nevertheless,

Robins contends “more prejudice was involved in this case than simply the
acquisition of certain pieces of evidence.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.14.) Specifically,
Robins argues “the state obtained knowledge [about potential defense strategies]
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as well as potential evidence.”

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.14-15.)

Robins further

asserts the district court “abused its discretion in fashioning [its] remedy because
it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards,” apparently
referring to legal standards never adopted by, and different than those set forth
in, Stuart. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.16-19.) Robins then asks for the extraordinary
remedy of vacating his convictions and dismissing the charges with prejudice.
(Appellant’s Brief, p.19.) All of Robins’ arguments fail.
Although Robins’ claim of error is predicated on the state’s acquisition of
potential defense strategies and evidence, he never identifies any actual strategy
or evidence the state became privy to as a result of its acquisition of his notes.
Robins asks this Court to ignore the absence of any proof of prejudice, and to
presume prejudice and dismiss his case. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.15-21.) Robins
argues that, because a trial was held, dismissal with prejudice is the only remedy
because “a second trial, even with a new prosecutor, will not arise from a
vacuum” since a “new prosecutor will review the previous trial and thus carry the
fruits of the state’s misdeeds forward in shaping the second trial,” whatever those
unidentified “fruits” of the “misdeeds” may be.

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.19, 21.)

Dismissal was not the remedy in Stuart or Martinez, it has never been the
remedy compelled by the United States Supreme Court for the type of violation
Robins alleges, and it is not the proper remedy in this case.
“Cases involving Sixth Amendment deprivations are subject to the general
rule that remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional
violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests.” United

10

States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 667-668 (1981). Supreme Court precedent
“reflects this approach.”

Id.

Thus, for example, retrial, not dismissal of the

indictment, has been recognized as the proper remedy in cases involving the
complete denial of counsel and ineffective assistance of counsel.
cases).

Id. (citing

Retrial is also the proper remedy when “law enforcement officers

improperly overheard pretrial conversations between a defendant and his
lawyer.”

Id.; see also Martinez, 102 Idaho at 879, 643 P.2d at 559

(“Governmental intrusion into the attorney-client relationship may be grounds for
a new trial” only if the defendant shows “substantial prejudice caused by the
intrusion.”).
“The premise” of Supreme Court precedent on this point “is that the
constitutional infringement identified has had or threatens some adverse effect
upon the effectiveness of counsel’s representation or has produced some other
prejudice to the defense.” Morrison, 449 U.S. at 365. But, “absent demonstrable
prejudice, or substantial threat thereof, dismissal of the indictment is plainly
inappropriate, even though the violation may have been deliberate.” Id.; The
Supreme Court has expressly applied this principle to situations in which
“conversations with counsel have been overheard.” Weatherford v. Bursey, 429
U.S. 545, 552 (1977).

In those circumstances, the Court concluded, “the

constitutionality

conviction

of

the

depends

on

whether

the

overheard

conversations have produced, directly or indirectly, any of the evidence offered at
trial.” Id. A “per se rule” in which “trial prejudice to the defendant is deemed
irrelevant” is improper.
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While Robins has cited cases from other jurisdictions in which the
extraordinary remedy of dismissal was given, that remedy is not consistent with
either Supreme Court precedent or Idaho precedent. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.1920.)

Moreover, the cases upon which Robins relies involve the intentional

eavesdropping on or interference with privileged communications, which is not
what occurred in Robins’ case. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.19-20 (citing State v. Cory,
382 P.2d 1019 (Wash. 1963) (microphone installed in conference room where
defendant met with his attorneys)2; United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200 (3rd Cir.
1978) (knowing invasion of attorney-client relationship by co-defendant who was
government informant); Commonwealth v. Manning, 367 N.E.2d 635 (Mass.
1977) (addressing “a deliberate and intentional attack by government agents on
the relationship between Manning and his counsel in a calculated attempt to
coerce the defendant into abandoning his defense”); People v. Moore, 57
Cal.App.3d 437 (Cal.App.4th Dist. 1976) (addressing “active[ ] interfere[nce] with
an attorney-client relationship established to defend Moore against the charges
for which he had been jailed”).)

2

The Court in Martinez specifically declined to adopt the remedy from Cory
finding the rule “inapposite” because there was no evidence that “trial tactics or
strategy” were revealed to Martinez’s trial attorney. Martinez, 102 Idaho at 879,
643 P.2d at 559. Significantly, the Court also noted that, while “[g]overnment
intrusion into the attorney-client relationship may be grounds for a new trial,” “a
defendant must show substantial prejudice caused by the intrusion.” Id.
(emphasis added). Robins attempts to reconcile Cory and Martinez by arguing
that “the privileged materials viewed by the prosecutor gave the state
forewarning about the defense strategy,” but he does not identify what strategy
was forewarned or how it was used by the state, nor does he explain why
Martinez’s statements that a defendant must show substantial prejudice and the
remedy for “intrusion into the attorney-client relationship” is a new trial do not
apply to him.
12

The more reasoned approach to disclosures of privileged information,
particularly inadvertent ones, is the one already taken by the United States
Supreme Court, Idaho’s courts, including the district court in this case, and courts
from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., State v. Russum, 333 P.3d 1191 (Or. 2014)
(inadvertent opening of inmate’s privileged mail does not create presumption of
prejudice; dismissal not proper remedy absent a showing of purposeful intrusion
and prejudice); Brown v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 416 S.W.2d 302 (Ky.
2013) (no Sixth Amendment violation based on inadvertent acquisition of
privileged material without showing of prejudice); Carter v. State, 817 A.2d 277
(Md. App. 2003) (remedy for use of privileged documents at trial was new trial);
Haworth v. State, 840 P.2d 912 (Wy. 1992) (to establish Sixth Amendment
violation based on intrusion into attorney-client privilege, defendant must show
substantial prejudice); State v. Warner, 722 P.2d 291 (Ariz. 1986) (concluding
remedy for alleged Sixth Amendment violation based on interference with
attorney-client relationship depends on whether defendant was prejudiced by the
intrusion).
Robins has failed to show the district court’s compliance with Idaho
precedent constituted an abuse of discretion, and has failed to show his Sixth
Amendment rights were violated. As a result, Robins has failed to show he is
entitled to any relief, much less the drastic remedy of dismissal with prejudice.
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II.
Robins Has Failed To Show His Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel Was
Violated When The District Court Denied His Request To Have The Ability To
Call His Attorney Anytime He Wanted During “Business Hours”
A.

Introduction
Robins claims the district court erred in denying his motion requesting

access to his attorney in the form of being able to call counsel anytime he wanted
to during “business hours.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp.22-26.) Neither the facts nor
the law support Robins’ claim that he was denied meaningful access to his
attorney.
B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one

of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
facts found. Bromgard, 139 Idaho at 380, 79 P.3d at 739.
C.

Robins’ Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel Was Not Violated When The
District Court Denied His Request To Call Counsel Anytime During
“Business Hours”
Robins was represented by two private attorneys – Brian McMonagle from

Philadelphia and local counsel, Scott McKay. (R., pp.50-51.) Approximately four
months prior to trial, Robins filed a motion seeking an order “compelling the State
of Idaho and officials of the Ada County Jail to permit him reasonable access to a
telephone in order to call his defense attorneys,” claiming he was being “denied
reasonable access to counsel.”

(R., p.218.)

More specifically, Robins

complained that because he only had “access to the telephone to call his
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attorneys” one hour a day, which “often occurs during non-business hours,” he
was “unable to contact his attorneys when it [was] necessary for him to do so.”
(R., p.222.)

As an example, Robins noted that, on September 2, 2015, his

access to the phone was from 6:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. MDT. (R., p.222 n.1.)
McKay filed a declaration in support of the motion noting that, “[o]n many days,
[he] do[es] not arrive at [his] office prior to 7:00 a.m.” (R., p.227.) McKay further
stated he had been advised by Robins “that he ha[d] been unable to contact his
lawyers at times that he has needed to call his lawyers because of the limited
time he is permitted telephone access.” (R., p.227.) Robins did not detail what
those times were or what efforts he made “to contact his lawyers” when he
“needed to.” (See generally R., pp.221-224, 226-227.) Nevertheless, Robins
claimed he was subject to an “ongoing deprivation” of his Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, and his rights under Article I, Section 13 of the
Idaho Constitution. (R., p.219.)
The state filed a response to Robins’ motion. (R., pp.248-258.) In its
response, the state described the limitations on Robins’ access to the telephone
in the maximum security unit where he was confined. (R., p.249.) In that unit,
“each inmate is allowed out of [his] cell one hour a day to go to the dayroom.
While in the dayroom, the inmate may shower, watch T.V., read books, use the
telephone or go outside.” (R., p.249.) That one hour period is scheduled on a
rotating basis between 6:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. (R., p.249.) For example, if an
inmate’s one hour period is scheduled from 6:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. on one day,
he will be scheduled from 7:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. the following day, and from 9:00
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a.m. to 10:00 a.m. the day after that. (R., p.249.) “It takes two weeks to go
through the entire day room schedule.” (R., p.249; see, e.g., R., p.260.) The
state’s response further explained that in-person attorney visits “are unlimited.”
(R., p.249.) “They can occur twenty-four (24) hours a day without prior notice to
the jail.” (R., p.249.) Inmates may also communicate with their attorneys in
writing. (R., p.249.) The state’s response also outlined Robins’ telephone use
during the 235 days he had been in custody. That use included “1,071 calls out”
and 494 “completed calls,” totaling 149 hours on the phone. (R., p.250.) Of
those 1,071 calls, Robins “never dialed his attorney of record, Brian McMonagle
at either his cell or office phone, and he only dialed McKay on four occasions,
three of which were on the same day.” (R., p.250 (emphasis original).)
At the hearing on his motion to compel, Robins argued that, “when he
needs to call his lawyer, he needs to call his lawyer,” and his access to counsel is
“functionally denied” if he is forced to call “on a schedule.” (9/23/2015 Tr., p.169,
L.8 – p.170, L.14.) Robins proposed the following “solution” – if he asks to call
his lawyer, the jail must accommodate that request. (9/23/2015 Tr., p.170, Ls.1517.)
The court denied Robins’ motion “unless and until” Robins showed he was
actually prejudiced by the telephone schedule. (9/23/2015 Tr., p.183, Ls.5-8.)
The district court did not err in denying Robins’ request to call his attorney
outside his scheduled access to the telephone.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution affords criminal
defendants the right to counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685
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(1984). It does not, however, give defendants the right to unfettered access to
counsel. Robins, however, contends his Sixth Amendment right to the effective
assistance of counsel was violated because, he argues, “the jail interfered with
an opportunity for meaningful consultation with counsel by limiting [his] phone
access to one hour a day, at times at an hour outside of business hours so that
counsel could not be reached at their offices.”

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.22-25.)

Fatal to Robins’ claim is that he has never demonstrated, below or on appeal,
that he was actually denied access to his attorneys as a result of the telephone
schedule. In fact, the evidence in the record demonstrates that Robins rarely
bothered even trying to call his attorney. Of the four calls Robins made to local
counsel four months prior to filing his motion, three were on the same day. (R.,
p.262.) Although those calls were unanswered, likely because they were made
between 6:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m., Robins was able to get a message to his
attorney through his sister, which resulted in local counsel visiting the following
Monday, three days after the calls were made. (R., pp.262-263.) Under no
standard does this example demonstrate a lack of meaningful access to counsel.
This is true regardless of the time of day Robins had access to the telephone
because the same result – three unanswered calls – could occur regardless of
whether Robins made the calls at 6:00 a.m. or during “business hours.” As
Robins acknowledges on appeal, attorneys do not sit around their offices waiting
for their clients to call. (Appellant’s Brief, p.25.) Rather, if a client wishes to
speak to his attorney, the common practice surely involves the client leaving a
message for counsel, which is precisely what occurred when Robins asked his
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sister to contact his attorney. This example illustrates why Robins’ argument that
“counsel cannot know other than by a phone call that the jailed client has an
issue he wants to discuss” (Appellant’s Brief, p.25) does not support his claimed
Sixth Amendment violation.
Robins tries to minimize the evidence that he was not actually denied
access to counsel given his all but non-existent efforts to contact counsel by
arguing that just because he “did not need to call counsel before the motion for
access, did not mean that he would not need to call counsel after the motion.”
(Appellant’s Brief, p.25.) According to Robins, “the most reasonable expectation
is that the need for communication would escalate, not remain constant or
decline.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.25.) This very well may be true, but it also fails to
demonstrate an actual constitutional violation. Moreover, the district court did not
foreclose Robins’ ability to return to the court and seek relief if he was ever
actually prejudiced by the telephone schedule. (9/23/2015 Tr., p.183, Ls.5-8.)
Robins never did.

Robins is not entitled to relief based on a speculative

constitutional violation.3

3

Robins argues that “[g]iven there was a violation, the burden is upon the state
to prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt” and indicates he will
“respond to whatever harmlessness arguments the state presents in his Reply
Brief.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.26.) Since Robins has failed to argue, much less
demonstrate, that he was actually deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, there is no constitutional violation that would require a harmless error
analysis. The state can hardly be expected to guess what unarticulated
prejudice Robins thinks he suffered at trial based on the jail’s telephone schedule
and make a harmless error argument in response.
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III.
Robins Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion To
Sever
A.

Introduction
Robins contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his

motion to sever his case from his co-defendant Douglas’s case, claiming “the
facts of his trial demonstrate that unfair prejudice resulted from the joint trial and
denied him a fair trial.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.9.) To the contrary, a review of the
record shows that the district court applied the correct legal standards in denying
Robins’ pretrial motion to sever.
B.

Standard Of Review
“[A]n abuse of discretion standard is applied when reviewing the denial of

a motion to sever joinder pursuant to I.C.R. 14; however, that rule presumes
joinder was proper in the first place.” State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 564, 165
P.3d 273, 278 (2007).

The same abuse of discretion standard applies to

reviewing the admission of evidence. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 218, 245
P.3d 961, 970 (2010) (citations omitted). In determining whether the district court
abused its discretion, this Court considers “(1) whether the lower court rightly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards
applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by
an exercise of reason.” State v. Ellington, 157 Idaho 480, 485, 337 P.3d 639,
644 (2014) (quotations and citation omitted).
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C.

The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion In Denying Robins’
Motion To Sever
Robins aided and abetted Douglas in the first degree murders of Elliott

Bailey and Travonte Calloway, and in the attempted first degree murder of
Jeanette Juraska (R., pp.114-116.) The state originally filed separate cases
against Robins and Douglas, but later moved to consolidate them “on the
grounds and for the reasons that the facts, evidence and witnesses are the same
in each case.” (R., pp.42-43.) The district court granted the state’s motion, and
the cases were consolidated prior to the preliminary hearing at which both
defendants were bound over to district court. (R., pp.44, 100-106, 113.)
Approximately four months later, Robins filed a Motion for Relief from
Prejudicial Joinder, arguing severance was required because Robins would
“suffer unfair prejudice if he [was] tried jointly with” Douglas. (R., p.161.) Robins
filed a memorandum in support of his motion in which he more specifically
argued that severance was warranted due to the “admissibility of a letter that”
Douglas “allegedly” wrote to Robins after their arrest. (R., p.164.) According to
Robins, “the introduction of such evidence in a joint trial” would violate his
“constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses and would unfairly prejudice
him.” (R., p.164.) The letter at the center of Robins’ motion to sever was written
to Robins by Douglas while he and Robins were in custody at the Ada County
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Jail.4 (R., p.305; see also pp.199-200, 379 (stipulation that Exhibit 133 “was
written and authored by John C. Douglas”).) In the letter, Douglas wrote:
This is how we gonna play this. You get with your Ls tell him you
want to cut a deal. But this is what you tell them, Tone ordered 30
ps. Them dudes took the 30 ps from Tone. He called you asked
you did you know anybody who wanted to put in some work. You
called me told me somebody, ‘Tone,” wanted to holler at me so
Tone flew me down there Boise told me what he wanted me to do.
Only reason you and Cook was down there was to pick me up and
head out to Vegas or somewhere to party for Cook’s birthday. So
when y’all got down there we all kicked it for a couple of days. The
day of the murder you went where you went and Cook went to the
strip club. When you got back that’s when I said ya we out. That’s
when you said Cook had the van keys. That’s when you called girl
to take us to the stip club, you still didn’t know what happened at
this time. We got Cook, came back. You hit girl. We packed and
left. People started hiting you up telling you what happened.
That’s when you asked me what what’s up. That’s when i told you i
bodyed them 2 dudes. Now listen, this is the story you have to fill
in the blanks. You tell them everything he said you did you tell
them he did. Once you get back at me and let me know you got the
deal you want, i will let them know i want to plea out. That’s when i
will back your story about Tone was the driver and he gave me
money, gun, everything, not you. Run this by your Ls and get back
with me. Ant5, no need both of us going down. I already know y’all
will play y’all part because love & loyalty. Tell your Ls to get at me
so we can put this shit in motion A.S.A.P. P.S. or do you want to
go with i plea out and you go to trial? Call me for witness and tell
them Tone drove the van, gave me the gun. I put this hit together,
it’s your call. Get with your tell him to come see me or what ever.
Let me know which way to go.
Peace Love
Big Homie J

4

As noted by the district court, it is this letter “that was the subject of the search”
that resulted in the collection of the document that was the subject of Robins’
breach of attorney-client privilege claim. (R., p.304 n.18.)

5

Robins suggests this word is “aint” (Appellant’s Brief, p.27); the state submits it
is “Ant,” which is Robins’ nickname (see 1/25/2016 Tr., p.10, Ls.9-10).
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(Exhibit 1336 (some punctuation and capitalization added for readability,
otherwise verbatim).)
In rejecting Robins’ request for severance, the court determined that,
because the letter would be admissible at separate trials, severance was
unnecessary. (R., pp.305-312.) The district court’s admissibility determination
was predicated on I.R.E. 804(b)(3), the statement against interest exception to
hearsay.

(R., pp.306-307.)

This exception “allows for the admission of a

statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant’s
penal interest that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have
made the statement unless the declarant believed it to be true.” State v. Averett,
142 Idaho 879, 890, 136 P.3d 350, 361 (Ct. App. 2006). In Averett, the Court
referenced a three-part test for determining whether a statement qualifies for
admission under I.R.E. 804(b)(3). 142 Idaho at 890, 136 P.3d at 361. That test
requires consideration of whether the statement (1) is “genuinely self-inculpatory
to the declarant”; (2) “is made to a private person and does not seek to curry the
favor of law enforcement authorities”; and (3) “does not shift blame.”7 Averett,
142 Idaho at 890, 136 P.3d at 361. Whether a statement is “genuinely selfincriminatory” “requires an examination of context and the factual setting in which

6

The letter (Exhibit 133) is included as Appendix A in the Appellant’s Brief.

7

In State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 243, 220 P.3d 1055, 1062 (2009), the Idaho
Supreme Court adopted a seven-factor test to apply “to determine whether the
third-party confessions are sufficiently corroborated in accordance with I.R.E.
804(b)(3). Robins has not, however, raised the corroboration requirement as an
issue (Appellant’s Brief, pp.30-33), nor was it raised as an issue in his motion to
sever (R., pp.164-168).
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it was given.” Averett, 142 Idaho at 890, 136 P.3d at 361. Averett illustrates how
I.R.E. 804(b)(3) should be applied.
While in jail, Averett’s co-conspirator, Johnston, made statements to her
cellmate describing the process she used to make methamphetamine and
claiming that “Averett was involved in making methamphetamine, both for his
own use and for his personal war against the government.” Averett, 142 Idaho at
889-890, 136 P.3d at 360-361. The district court admitted the statements under
I.R.E. 804(b)(3).

Id.

The Court of Appeals applied the three-part test for

admission under I.R.E. 804(b)(3), and held “that the major portion of Johnston’s
declaration [fell] squarely within the [exception]” because the statements “were
genuinely self-incriminatory, admitting to Johnston’s knowledge, association and
direct involvement with the manufacture of methamphetamine, evidencing her
desire to enlist [her cellmate] to secrete evidence from the police, as well as
attempting to solicit [her cellmate] to help her make more methamphetamine
upon her release.” Averett, 142 Idaho at 890-891, 136 P.3d at 361-362. The
Court reasoned that, “[i]n context, these statements, while uttered in a jail setting,
were not given to police as a self-serving confession but to a cellmate in an
attempt to expand Johnston’s criminal involvement; nor did these declarations
attempt to curry favor or shift blame away from Johnston and onto Averett.” Id.
at 891, 136 P.3d at 362. The only statement the Court of Appeals found should
not have been admitted was “Johnston’s statement that Averett made
methamphetamine for his own use and for his personal war against the
government”; this statement was not admissible under I.R.E. 804(b)(3) because it
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“was in no way self-inculpatory as to Johnston.”

Id.

The admission of the

statement was, however, harmless error. Id.
The district court considered the conditions articulated in Averett and
correctly concluded they were satisfied, reasoning:
Here, the letter is genuinely self-inculpatory as to Mr. Douglas as
he places the blame on himself for committing the murders. In fact,
no part of the letter seeks to shift the blame to Mr. Robins, but
rather seeks to give Mr. Robins an alibi, so that both Defendants do
not have to “go down” for the crime. In addition, the letter was
meant to be delivered to Mr. Robins, not to law enforcement.
Indeed, the context would clearly indicate that Mr. Douglas would
not want law enforcement to see it. The letter contains statements
that were not intended to be given to law enforcement as a selfserving confession, but rather to another inmate in an attempt to
create a story which Mr. Douglas believed would help both
Defendants in their cases. See State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879,
891, 136 P.3d 350, 362 (Ct. App. 2006).
(R., p.306.)
On appeal, Robins does not contend that Exhibit 133 was inadmissible in
its entirety. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.30-33.) Robins instead argues that “the court
abused its discretion because it admitted [Exhibit 133] in toto without
individualized consideration of the many statements to determine which fell within
the hearsay exception,” and that the “court’s erroneous ruling on the admissibility
of the letter also led it to deny the motion to sever.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.30.)
Robins’ argument fails to show reversible error in either the district court’s
determination regarding the admissibility of Exhibit 133, or in the district court’s
denial of Robins’ request to sever based upon Exhibit 133.
Although the district court did not analyze each statement in Exhibit 133,
its analysis did not run afoul of Averett because the entire letter is, in context, a
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single self-incriminatory statement in that it details Douglas’ willingness to
inculpate himself in the murders and absolve Robins, and outlines a story Robins
can provide to further this end. In this way, there is no meaningful distinction
between Exhibit 133 and the statements deemed admissible in Averett. Robins’
claim that the district court failed to comply with Averett is based on a narrow and
incorrect reading of what Averett actually requires as evidenced by his argument
that the “only portion” of Exhibit 133 that qualified for admission as a statement
against interest was Douglas’ statement, “I bodyed them 2 dudes.” (Appellant’s
Brief, p.32.)

This argument ignores Averett’s acknowledgement that context

matters, and that statements are admissible if they are self-inculpatory, as all of
Douglas’ letter was. Averett, 142 Idaho at 890-891, 136 P.3d at 361-362. Exhibit
133 satisfies the Averett criteria. Robins has failed to show otherwise.
Because the district court correctly concluded that Exhibit 133 was
admissible against both Robins and Douglas, Robins was not entitled to
severance on the basis that Exhibit 133 was not admissible against him. See
I.C.R. 14 (severance required only if defendant is prejudiced by joinder); see also
State v. Tankovich, 155 Idaho 221, 227, 307 P.3d 1247, 1253 (Ct. App. 2013)
(“When reviewing an order denying a severance motion, the inquiry on appeal is
whether the defendant has presented facts demonstrating that unfair prejudice
resulted from a joint trial.”).
Even if Robins is correct that the district court should have redacted some
of the statements contained within Exhibit 133, any error in the admission of
those statements was harmless. Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that “[a]ny
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error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall
be disregarded.” I.C.R. 52. The inquiry is whether “‘the guilty verdict actually
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’” State v. Joy, 155
Idaho 1, 11, 304 P.3d 276, 286 (2013) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.
275, 279 (1993) (emphasis omitted)).
The only statement Robins identifies as one that “should have been
redacted,” is the statement, “no need both of us going down.” (Appellant’s Brief,
pp.32-33.) Robins claims this statement “is not an admission of guilt, but rather
an evaluation of the state’s case which included an eyewitness identification of
Mr. Douglas by the surviving victim and the informant testimony of Mr. Raider.”
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.32-33.) In context, Douglas’ statement “no need both of us
going down” is clearly self-inculpatory. Robins’ claim to the contrary is without
merit. Regardless, even assuming the statement should have been redacted,
any error in its admission was harmless in light of the evidence presented at trial
supporting the jury’s verdicts finding Robins guilty of aiding and abetting Douglas
in the murders of Elliott Bailey and Travonte Calloway, and the attempted murder
of Jeanette Juraska. (See, e.g., Exhibits 97-99 (phone records); 1/22/2016 Tr.,
pp.26-137 (Juraska’s testimony); 1/25/2016 Tr., pp.6-192 (Raider’s testimony).)
Given the evidence presented, any error in the admission of the Exhibit 133 was
harmless.8

8

The same harmless error analysis would apply to the motion to sever.
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IV.
Robins Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Awarding
Restitution To Medicaid For Payments It Made On Behalf Of Jeanette Juraska
And Travonte Calloway For Medical Services They Received After Being Shot
A.

Introduction
The district court awarded restitution to several entities, including Medicaid

State Operations (“Medicaid”). (R., p.14.) The award to Medicaid was based on
its payment for medical services rendered to Jeanette Juraska and Travonte
Calloway after Douglas shot them. (PSI, pp.93-94.) Robins asserts, as he did
below, that Medicaid is not entitled to restitution because it does not qualify as a
victim for purposes of the restitution statute because there was no evidence that
it made the payments pursuant to a contract.

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.35-40.)

Application of the correct legal principles to the facts of this case shows Robins
has failed to meet his burden of showing error in relation to the district court’s
restitution order.
B.

Standard Of Review
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed

to the trial court’s discretion. State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, 211, 296 P.3d 412, 417
(Ct. App. 2013). The trial court’s factual findings in relation to restitution will not
be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Straub, 153 Idaho
882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013); State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249
P.3d 398, 401 (2011).
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The appellate court exercises free review over the application and
construction of statutes.

State v. Hickman, 146 Idaho 178, 191 P.3d 1098

(2008).
C.

Robins Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Determining That Medicaid Qualifies As A Victim For Purposes Of
Restitution Based On Its Conclusion That Medicaid Incurred Economic
Losses By Paying For Medical Services Rendered To Two Directly Injured
Victims As A Result Of Robins’ Criminal Conduct
The district court ordered restitution in the following amounts, to be paid

joint and several between Robins, Douglas, and Winn:
VICTIMS COMPENSATION PROGRAM

$ 10,000.00

ADA COUNTY PARAMEDICS

$

ST ALPHON[S]US

$ 101,670.74

GEM STATE RADIOLOGY

$

MEDICAID STATE OPERATIONS

$ 72,791.50

2,626.00

24.20

(R., pp.521-522.)
Prior to entering the restitution order, the court scheduled a “restitution
review status conference” at which the court indicated it received emails “which
narrowed the issues” with respect to restitution. (9/9/2016 Tr., p.427, Ls.5-9.)
Counsels’ arguments indicated those issues were (1) whether restitution was
appropriate based on Robins’ inability to pay; and (2) whether Medicaid is a
“directly injured victim as contemplated by the statute.” (9/9/2016 Tr., p.427,L.17
– p.431, L.1.) As to the second issue, Robins argued:
If you look at Idaho Code 19-5304, subsection (E), defines victim.
And there are different subsets under (E) sub (I), double (I), triple
(I), and quadruple (I). And the only one of these that could even be
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argued to apply in this situation is this sub four section: “A person
or entity who suffers economic loss because such person or entity
has made payments to or on behalf of a directly injured victim,” but
then it goes on to say: “Pursuant to a contract, including but not
limited to an insurance contract.”
And so that’s the statute that the State relies on to recover
restitution on behalf of insurance companies. Say you are Blue
Cross or you’re Blue Shield or an insurance company which has
paid the directly injured victim. But that is paid pursuant to a
contract, that’s not the situation with Medicaid. And there certainly
is no evidence in this record that establishes that that obligation -whatever Medicaid paid here -- was pursuant to a contract.
(9/9/2016 Tr., p.430, Ls.6-24 (verbatim).)
The state responded to Robins’ objection to ordering restitution payable to
Medicaid, stating, in relevant part:

“clearly Medicaid and Saint Alphonsus

Hospital sign up and enter into their own contracts as far as complying. They
can’t get reimbursed unless they enter into agreements with and contracts with
Medicaid.”

(9/9/2016 Tr., p.432, Ls.18-22.)

The state asked the court “to

understand that there’s contracts present, that’s how they recover,” but indicated
that if the “court need[ed] further information on that, [she’d] move to reopen on
that” issue and “provide further information.” (9/9/2016 Tr., p.433, Ls.6-14.) In
response, Robins argued:
With respect to Medicaid; there’s no evidence. I don’t know
what counsel was referring to when she refers to contracts that may
exist between the hospital or Medicaid or how these were paid.
And that’s just unsupported representations by counsel and if the
court were to look at State versus Cheney at 144 Idaho 294, a 2007
decision from the Idaho Court of Appeals, that’s a decision that
talked about restitution and inappropriateness of the court’s
reliance on unsupported representations of counsel to make a
finding of restitution.
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There’s no contractual obligation that’s in this record that
supports the award of restitution to Medicaid in this case and we
object to it.
(9/9/2016 Tr., p.434, L.18 – p.435, L.5.)
When asked if he would “agree” that “Medicaid is provided by statute,”
Robins answered, “Yes.”

(9/9/2016 Tr., p.435, Ls.6-8.)

The district court

thereafter overruled both of Robins’ objections to restitution.

(9/9/2016 Tr.,

p.435, L.9 – p.437, L.13.) Regarding whether Medicaid qualified as a victim for
purposes of restitution, the district court, relying on I.C. § 19-5304, stated:
I think that Medicaid is required to pay pursuant to statute,
and I do think that it’s a well-known fact that Medicaid contracts are
required between the providers and Medicaid and, in fact, Medicaid
pays substantially less than most insurance companies and
certainly less than people who are charged who don’t have either
insurance or Medicaid. And as a consequence of that, the
hospitals and doctors and such as that who do accept Medicaid
cannot request additional monies from the victims for the difference
in terms of what they might normally charge and what they do
receive and that’s pursuant to contract and pursuant to statute.
Finally, Medicaid is certainly in the nature of insurance. And
so for all those reasons, I’m going to find that the defendant does
have to pay the Medicaid amounts pursuant to that particular
section of the code.
(9/9/2016 Tr., p.436, L.10 – p.437, L.11.)
Robins has failed to show error in the district court’s restitution decision.
For purposes of the restitution statute, the term “victim” includes:
A person or entity who suffers economic loss because such
person or entity has made payments to or on behalf of a directly
injured victim pursuant to a contract including, but not limited to, an
insurance contract, or payments to or on behalf of a directly injured
victim to pay or settle a claim or claims against such person or
entity in tort or pursuant to a statute and arising from the crime.
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I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(iv). “Economic loss,” in turn, includes “medical expenses
resulting from the criminal conduct.” I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a).
The Court of Appeals has recognized that “Section 19-5304(1)(e)(iv)
unambiguously includes in the definition of victim any person or entity who
suffers economic loss because such person or entity has made payments to or
on behalf of a directly-injured victim pursuant to a contract.” State v. Cheeney,
144 Idaho 294, 297, 160 P.3d 451, 454 (Ct. App. 2007). This statutory language
applies to “third parties who incurred a loss pursuant to a contractual obligation to
make payments to or on behalf of a directly injured victim.” Id. “Such third-party
victims could include insurance companies or any other party that makes
payments to or on behalf of the directly injured victim pursuant to a contract.” Id.
“[W]hether payments were made pursuant to a contract is a question of fact for
the trial court.” Id.
Robins does not dispute that Medicaid incurred economic loss for
$72,791.50 in medical expenses paid on behalf of two directly injured victims,
Jeanette Juraska and Travonte Calloway, and this amount is supported by
documents submitted with the presentence investigation report.9 (PSI, pp.85-86,
93-94.) Rather, Robins argues, as he did below, that the restitution awarded to
Medicaid was impermissible because the state did not present evidence that
Medicaid paid those expenses pursuant to a contract. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.3340.) Robins is correct that the state did not present such evidence, but the
9

“Pursuant to Section 19-5304(6), the court may consider such hearsay as may
be contained in the PSI, victim impact statement, or otherwise provided to the
court.” Cheeney, 144 Idaho at 299, 160 P.3d at 456.
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absence of such evidence does not require reversal of the restitution award.
This is true for two reasons.
First, the district court found that Medicaid qualified as a victim “pursuant
to contract and pursuant to statute.”

(9/9/2016 Tr., p.437, Ls.6-7 (emphasis

added); see also p.436, Ls.21-22 (“I think Medicaid is required to pay pursuant to
statute”).) Robins claims error only in relation to the contract basis of the district
court’s decision, but not the statutory basis of the court’s decision. (Appellant’s
Brief, pp.35-39.) In fact, Robins agreed below that Medicaid is “provided by
statute” (9/9/2016 Tr., p.435, Ls.6-8), and he acknowledges on appeal that “it
seems more likely that the Medicaid payments were made pursuant to federal
statutes and regulations, not ‘pursuant to a contract’”10 (Appellant’s Brief, p.39).
Because the plain language of I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(iv) includes “payments to or
on behalf of a directly injured victim . . . pursuant to statute,” and because Robins
does not claim error in the district court’s determination that Medicaid also made
payments “pursuant to statute,” this Court may affirm on the unchallenged basis.
State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366–367, 956 P.2d 1311, 1313–1314 (Ct. App.
1998) (appellate court may affirm on unchallenged basis).
Second, although the Court in Cheeney indicated that “[e]ach party has
the right to present evidence on whether a person or entity qualifies as a victim,”
including evidence of “whether payments were made pursuant to a contract,” the

10

Medicaid is not solely a creature of federal law; it is funded and regulated by
the federal government and the states. https://www.healthandwelfare.idaho.gov;
https://www.ssa.gov/disabilityresearch/wi/medicaid.htm.
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state was relieved of presenting evidence regarding the details of any contract11
as a result of the district court’s determination that Medicaid is “in the nature of
insurance” and “it’s a well-known fact that Medicaid contracts are required
between the providers.” (9/9/2016 Tr., p.436, Ls.22-24, p.437, Ls.8-9.) Robins,
however, claims the district court could not “take judicial notice of a contract”
because such a fact does not comply with the requirements of I.R.E. 201
because, he argues, “[t]he rule on judicial notice does not permit the court to take
note of obscure ‘facts’ not capable of ready determination.” (Appellant’s Brief,
pp.37-38.) Whether Robins perceives a fact as obscure is irrelevant to whether
judicial notice was proper. Rule 201, I.R.E., authorizes a court to take judicial
notice of an adjudicative fact so long as it is either “(1) generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.” “A court’s decision to take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact is a
determination that is evidentiary in nature” and is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Fortin v. State, 160 Idaho 437, 442, 374 P.3d 600, 605 (Ct. App.
2016).
Even if it is not “generally known within the territorial jurisdiction” that
Medicaid “is in the nature of insurance” for its qualifying recipients, such a fact is

11

The evidence of Medicaid’s economic loss was available to the district court in
the form of summaries from the Idaho Medicaid Management Information System
Restitution Claims Detail documents, which itemize the expenses paid to various
providers on behalf of Jeanette Juraska and Travonte Calloway. (PSI, pp.93-94.)
The request for restitution from Medicaid State Operations was also referenced
in the PSI. (PSI, p.6.)
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“capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” i.e., the Idaho Code and the Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare (“IDHW”). Individuals must apply for Medicaid
benefits, which includes medical coverage, just as one would apply for private
health insurance.

http://healthandwelfare.idaho.gov/Default.aspx?TabId=123;

see also I.C. § 31-3503E (Medicaid eligibility determinations for medical
indigence); I.C. § 31-3504 (applications for assistance). Medicaid is no less an
insurance provider than a private insurer like Blue Cross just because a Medicaid
recipient does not pay insurance premiums. It can also be determined by resort
to IDHW’s website that IDHW contracts with providers to render services to
Medicaid

recipients.

http://healthandwelfare.idaho.gov/Providers/Providers-

Medicaid/tabid/214/Default.aspx. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, the
main recipient of payments itemized on the Idaho Medicaid Management
Information System Restitution Claims Detail documents for both Jeanette
Juraska

and

Travonte

Calloway,

is

one

such

provider.

(Compare

http://healthandwelfare.idaho.gov/Portals/0/Medical/LicensingCertification/Alpha
Hospital.pdf with PSI, pp.93-94.) Robins’ claim that the district court abused its
discretion by judicially noticing how Medicaid works fails.
Robins has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in
awarding restitution to Medicaid for payments it made on behalf of two individuals
who were directly injured by Robins’ criminal conduct.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and
sentences entered upon the jury verdicts finding Robins guilty of two counts of
aiding and abetting first degree murder and one count of aiding and abetting
attempted first degree murder.
DATED this 4th day of August 2017.
_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello________
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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